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ABSTRACT 
 
Bilateral negotiations between the United States (U.S.) 
and Mexico over the scale, location, and financing of 
water treatment facilities serving border twin cities fre-
quently break down, leaving water pollution and supply 
uncertainty problems unresolved.  Agreements reached 
have been reactive to immediate health emergencies, 
limited in scope, and have failed to address market fail-
ures that contributed to the environmental problems in 
the first place. New institutions created to address envi-
ronmental concerns over North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) have helped both nations plan, 
build, and finance new facilities in a more coordinated 
and proactive manner.  Yet, the goal of developing lo-
cally self-financing municipal water systems on both 
sides of the border has remained elusive. To illustrate, 
we use a case study of negotiations over water resources 
shared by Nogales, Arizona, and Nogales, Sonora.  
 
INTRODUCTION: THE UNITED STATES-
MEXICO BORDER REGION   
 
Rapid population growth along the United States (U.S.)-
Mexico border, combined with large disparities in the 
two countries’ incomes and financial resources, has pre-
sented challenges to management of transboundary wa-
ter pollution. In 1980, about 4 million people lived 
within 100 km of the U.S.-Mexico Border.  The border 
population grew to 10.5 million by 1997 and is pro-
jected to double over the next 20 years.  Over 90 percent 
of the border population are clustered in 14 pairs of sis-
ter cities.  The border region’s most serious public 
health problems are lack of access to safe drinking wa-
ter, sewage treatment, and solid and hazardous waste 
disposal.  Of 16.1 million people residing in Mexican 
border municipalities and U.S. border counties, 12 per-
cent do not have direct access to potable water, 18 per-
cent of the Mexican population, and 3 percent of the 
U.S. population (Table 1).  30 percent lack access to 
wastewater treatment facilities, 33 percent of to the 
Mexican population and 27 percent of the U.S. popula-
tion.  Another 25 percent of Mexico’s border munici-
palities lacked solid waste disposal facilities.  In 1997, 
only 69 percent of the Mexican border population lived 
in residences connected to sewage collection systems 
and only 34 percent of the collected wastewater was 
treated.  As of 1997, less than half of Mexican house-
holds along the border had solid waste collected and de-
posited in sanitary landfills, while 14 percent had no ac-
cess to solid waste collection services whatsoever.  As 
Table 1 shows, problems are not confined to the Mexi-
can side of the border.  U.S. problems are most acute in 
colonias – low income, unincorporated subdivisions 
lacking basic public services (Texas A&M University). 
Over 400,000 people live in colonias, primarily in Texas 
and New Mexico.  A study of colonias residents in 
Texas estimated that half of the state’s colonia popula-
tion of 350,000 did not have direct access to potable water 
(Texas A&M University).  
 
Untreated wastewater is a major transboundary external-
ity, as polluted water flows in many instances, north-
ward from Mexican to American cities (See Frisvold 
and Caswell for references to transboundary water pol-
lution incidents).1  Raw or partially treated wastewater 
flows into drinking water sources on both sides of the 
border.  Ciudad Juarez, adjacent to El Paso, Texas, has a 
population of over one million and its first wastewater 
treatment plant is only now nearing completion.  The 
cities of Chihuahua and Matamoros, Mexico also lack 
wastewater treatment systems.  The maquiladora  pro-
gram, that allows duty-free imports into Mexico of ma-
terials from foreign suppliers to produce goods for re-
export, has spurred rapid industrialization in the region, 
and with it, production of hazardous wastes.  While 
Mexican law requires hazardous wastes produced by 
maquiladoras to be either treated in Mexico or returned 
to the country of origin (usually the United States), stud-
ies have noted problems with Mexico’s hazardous waste 
disposal system (Johnstone, Hinojosa-Ojeda; U.S. 
GAO).  Industrial wastes, such as volatile organic com-
pounds, mercury and cyanide at levels exceeding U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards have 
been found in U.S. water supplies along the border 
(Igram & White, Johnstone, Sprouse et al., Varady & 
Mack).       
 41 
Table 1. Lack of Access to Water Infrastructure and Services in Border Region 
 
 
 
Population 
(millions) 
 
Population lacking services 
(millions) 
 
Percent lacking services 
    
Mexico border municipali-
ties 
9.6   
PoTable water  1.72 18 
Wastewater treatment  3.17 33 
Solid waste disposal  4.04 42 
    
U.S. border counties 6.5   
PoTable water  0.21 3 
Wastewater treatment  1.72 27 
Solid waste disposal  N/A N/A 
    
Total  16.1   
PoTable water  1.93 12 
Wastewater treatment  4.89 30 
Solid waste disposal  >4.04 >25 
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000.  Figures for 1999.   
 
 
Bilateral negotiations between the United States and 
Mexico over the scale, location, and financing of water 
treatment facilities serving border twin cities frequently 
break down, leaving water pollution and supply uncer-
tainty problems unresolved.  Agreements reached have 
been reactive to immediate health emergencies, limited 
in scope, and have failed to address market failures con-
tributing to the environmental problems in the first 
place. We present a case study of negotiations over wa-
ter resources shared by Nogales, Arizona and Nogales, 
Sonora, known collectively as “Ambos Nogales” to il-
lustrate our points.  Many of the problems faced by 
these cities are common to many other U.S.-Mexico 
border cities.  We begin by providing some background 
about the population, economy, and water resources in 
the region.  Next, we sketch out a brief history of water 
conflicts and negotiations.  A historical perspective is 
useful because there is a path dependence to how water 
conflicts have arisen and been addressed in Ambos No-
gales.  Earlier attempts to address particular problems, 
pre-condition the form subsequent negotiations and so-
lutions can take.   
 
New institutions created to address environmental con-
cerns over NAFTA have helped both nations plan, 
build, and finance new facilities in a more coordinated 
and proactive manner. The goal of developing locally 
self-financing municipal water systems on both sides of 
the border has remained elusive, however.  Recent U.S. 
government recommendations to enhance public and 
private investment in border water infrastructure call for 
greater strategic planning.  Yet, these policy discussions 
of both problems and solutions to border water pollution 
continue to consider water quality issues separately 
from critical, unresolved water quantity issues between 
the United States and Mexico.  The example of Ambos 
Nogales highlights the need to consider border water 
sanitation problems in conjunction with surface and 
ground water supply and demand.  
 
AMBOS NOGALES: POPULATION AND 
ECONOMY   
 
Ambos Nogales refers to the twin border cities of No-
gales, Arizona and Nogales, Sonora.  “Ambos” means 
“both” in Spanish and more than 80 percent of Nogales, 
Arizona residents speak Spanish (Ingram et al., 1994).  
The population of Nogales, Sonora is much larger and 
growing much more rapidly than Nogales, Arizona.  
The population of Nogales, Arizona is roughly 21,000, 
projected to increase to 27,000 by 2018.  Nogales, 
Sonora's population exceeds 206,000, nearly double its 
1990 population, and is projected to reach 345,000 by 
2018 (Morehouse et al., 2000).  
 
Increased trade with the United States has driven the 
population boom on the Mexican side of the border.  In 
1965, Mexico established the Border Industrialization 
Program that allowed foreign (predominantly U.S.) 
firms located in Mexico to import production inputs 
duty-free to assemble manufactured goods for re-export.  
These assembly plants, or maquiladoras, were origi-
nally required to operate within 12 miles of the U.S. 
border and allowed U.S. firms access to low-cost Mexi-
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can labor.  Critics have also argued that they allow U.S. 
firms to avoid environmental regulations and taxes to 
support local infrastructure (e.g., Johnstone).  Maqui-
ladoras employ 43 percent of Nogales, Sonora's work-
force (Ingram et al., 1994).  
 
The economies of both cities are highly integrated. 
Residents shop and conduct business across both sides 
of the border. Police, firefighters, and paramedics fre-
quently cross the border to respond to emergencies. No-
gales is a major port of entry for Mexican exports to the 
United States.  Nearly half of Mexico's winter vegetable 
exports to the United States pass through Nogales.  Vis i-
tors from Mexico account for about two-thirds of retail 
sales receipts in Santa Cruz County's (Nogales, Arizona, 
is the county seat).  Sales taxes, in turn, account for over 
half of the revenues of the city of Nogales, Arizona (In-
gram et al., 1994). 
 
WATER SUPPLIES  
 
Ambos Nogales lies in a valley that runs north to south 
and is bisected by the border.  At the southern, Mexican 
side of the valley, the hills are higher and quite steep.  
Both cities rely on ground water supplies that are re-
plenished by the Santa Cruz River and its tributary, the 
Nogales Wash.  The Santa Cruz originates in Arizona, 
20 miles east of Nogales.  It flows south into Mexico, 
then loops west and north back in the United States, five 
miles east of Nogales (Figure 1).  The Nogales Wash 
originates in Sonora, flows north through the very cen-
ter of Ambos Nogales and runs into the Santa Cruz, just 
upstream of the International Waste Water Treatment 
Plant 9 miles north of the border.  Average rainfall in 
the area is about 14 inches, with more than half occur-
ring during monsoon rains in July and August.  While 
the Santa Cruz is mostly perennial in Mexico, it is 
ephemeral on the U.S. side of the border.  Exc ept during 
storms, the stream channel is usually dry two miles 
north of the border.  Treated effluent from the Interna-
tional Treatment Plant creates a perennial stream flow 
for a 12-mile stretch of the Santa Cruz.  
 
Nogales, Sonora, obtains 45 percent of its water from 
shallow well fields east and southeast of the city.  These 
wells can run dry in drought years, leaving residents 
vulnerable to water shortages (Ingram and White, 1993).   
Additional water is now piped in from ground water 
wells in the Los Alisos basin 20 miles south of the city.  
The Los Alisos well fields currently supply 40 percent 
of the city's water, but this source may not be renew-
able.  There is evidence that this aquifer is not being 
significantly recharged by rainfall (Morehouse et al. 
2000).  The remaining 15 percent of the city's water 
supply come from urban wells near the Nogales Wash.  
This water is treated as a reserve supply because of its 
poor quality.  Leaks and breaks in sewage and potable 
water pipes feed the Wash.  Monitor wells on the No-
gales Wash were found to have elevated levels of try-
cloroethylene (TCE), tetrocholoroethylene (PCE), and 
fecal coliform  (Arizona Department of Public Health, 
1993; Morehouse et al., 2000; Sprouse et al., 1996).    
 
Provision of water infrastructure and other public ser-
vices has not kept pace with population growth in No-
gales, Sonora.  Many residents live in colonias, unde-
veloped settlements generally lacking the most basic 
services.  These settlements have grown up steep hill-
sides.  Only 39 percent of the population receives water 
24 hours a day, while 15 percent are not connected to 
the system at all.  Residents outside the system either 
tap into it illegally or purchase water from tank trucks 
(Liverman et al,1997; Morehouse et al.,2000; Ingram et 
al.,1994). The poorest residents, who often live higher 
up on the hillsides, must make frequent purchases of 
small quantities of water, even purchasing it by the gallon 
in U.S. grocery stores. Per capita water consumption in No-
gales, Sonora is roughly 40 gallons per person per day, one-
fifth of per capita water consumption in Nogales, Arizona. 
 
Arizona's major source of water is a well field between 
the border and the International Treatment Plant. The 
storage capacity in this well field is limited and the wa-
ter table can drop quickly in drought years; but unlike 
the Sonora wells, these have never actually run dry. A 
second well field northwest of the city has deeper wells 
that are less sensitive to changes in rainfall.  A cone of 
depression has recently formed around these wells, how-
ever, indicating that overdrafting is occurring (Morehouse, 
et al., 2000). 
 
Nogales, Arizona, lies within the larger Santa Cruz Ac-
tive Management Area (AMA) that surrounds the Santa 
Cruz river basin and runs from the U.S. - Mexico border 
in the south to just beyond the border of Santa Cruz and 
Pima Counties to the North.  Arizona's Ground Water 
Code requires the establishment of AMAs in areas with 
high potential for ground water overdrafting.  The Santa 
Cruz AMA (SCAMA) is administered by the Arizona 
Department of Water Resources (ADWR) office in No-
gales.  ADWR is tasked with maintaining a “safe-yield 
condition” (i.e. no secular decline in the water table).  
ADWR has authority to regulate well operators and wa-
ter providers and may prohibit new irrigated agricultural 
use, license new wells, establish well spacing rules, and 
impose mandatory conservation requirements.  The 
Ground Water Code also gives the SCAMA office au-
thority to require subdivision developers to demonstrate 
the availability of drinking-quality water supplies for 
100 years for any new developments. 
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The treated effluent from the International Treatment 
Plant plays an increasingly important role in ADWR's 
plans to maintain safe-yield conditions in the SCAMA.  
From 1992-1995, treated effluent from the plant ac-
counted for 38 percent of the total inflow into the 
SCAMA and 47 percent of renewable supply (total in-
flow minus uncaptured underflow leaving SCAMA) 
(Morehouse, et al.).  The treated effluent, placed back in 
the Santa Cruz River streambed, has also created a 
riparian habitat that supports local and migratory bird 
populations.  The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is cur-
rently investigating whether the yellow-billed cuckoo 
that resides in the riparian area should be considered for 
designation as a threatened or endangered species under 
the Endangered Species Act.  Likewise, populations of 
Gila topminnow are under consideration for endangered 
species listing.   From 1992-95, maintenance of stream 
flow for the riparian area accounted for 57 percent of 
water use in the SCAMA.    
 
The International Treatment Plant treats wastewater 
from both Nogales, Sonora, and from Nogales, Mexico.  
About 70 percent of the untreated wastewater comes 
from Mexico, and by treaty, Mexico has the right to re-
tain or recapture the effluent.  If Mexico were to retain 
its effluent, it would become more difficult to maintain 
the riparian habitat in Arizona in dry years. Thus far, it 
has proven prohibitively expensive for Mexico to con-
struct a system to pipe the effluent uphill back to 
Sonora.  Mexico has expressed a desire to construct a 
new treatment plant on its side of the border in order to 
capture the effluent for irrigation or industrial use.  The 
United States has opposed this idea, expressing concern 
that Mexico would not construct a large enough facility 
or maintain it sufficiently to prevent deterioration of 
U.S. water supplies.  Maintaining continued access to 
the Mexico's share of the treated effluent is also an im-
portant U.S. consideration (ADWR; GUAC).    
 
WATER QUALITY  
 
On the Mexican side of the border, thousands of resi-
dents live without sewer connections or garbage re-
moval services.  Roughly 20 percent are not connected 
to the municipal sewer system.  Out of this percentage, 
half use septic tanks, a third use simple latrines, and the 
remainder dispose of waste into the streets or open envi-
ronment (Ingram et al., 1994).   During the heavy mo n-
soon rains of July-August, raw sewage flows down hilly 
terrain into the Nogales Wash through the center of 
Ambos Nogales and through neighborhoods on both 
sides of the border (Ingram & White, 1993; Varady et al., 
1995).   
 
Aside from imposing obvious health risks to Sonoran 
residents, untreated flows from leaking pipes and storms 
impose externalities on residents of Nogales, Arizona. 
In July of 1990, flooding and broken sewer lines led to 
fecal coliform levels in the Santa Cruz River and No-
gales Wash reaching from 8 thousand CFU / 100 ml, dou-
ble the Arizona regulatory standard of 4 thousand CFU / 100 
ml.  In August, readings shot up to 1.6 million CFU / 100 ml 
after a Sonoran sewer line ruptured.  In 1991, levels of cyanide 
and mercury, exceeding EPA limits were detected in the 
Wash (Ingram and White, 1993). Giardia, cryptosporidium, 
parasites, petroleum, and heavy metals have also been 
detected in the Wash (Varady & Mack, 1995). Following 
heavy rains in 1990, VOC levels were found to be so 
high that the county government declared a health emer-
gency (Sprouse et al., 1996).  In 1994, 2,000 residents had 
to be evacuated from the downtown because the dump-
ing of petroleum products into the Nogales Wash pro-
duced potentially explosive fumes (Varady et al., 1995). 
 
Some of these contaminants have also shown up in the 
ground water of the underlying Santa Cruz Basin aqui-
fer, the primary source of drinking water in the area.  
All but one of the public water systems serving Santa 
Cruz County, Arizona, is either classified as small (serv-
ing 1,000 – 3,300 persons) or very small (serving fewer than 
1,000 persons) (Sprouse et al., 1996).  The rapid growth 
of population and pollution just south of the border has 
stressed these small systems' abilities to meet require-
ments of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA).  Seven 
of the water systems have been found in non-
compliance with the SDWA because of bacterial con-
tamination and one was found in non-compliance be-
cause of nitrate contamination (Sprouse et al., 1996). 
Ground water samples have also found levels of VOCs 
in excess of SDWA standards (Hayes, 1996). 
 
HISTORY OF WATER CONFLICTS AND 
NEGOTIATIONS 
 
There are five salient features of water resource man-
agement in and around Ambos Nogales that frame the 
debate over the future of water use in the area.  The first 
is the importance of transboundary externalities, namely 
water pollution flowing from Sonora into Arizona.   
Second, is the large difference in incomes and economic 
resources available to the United States and Mexico to 
address water availability and pollution problems.  
Third, while representatives and citizens of both cities 
have historically expressed interest in developing a joint 
municipal water system, this has been hampered by a 
lack of agreement on broader border water issues be-
tween the U.S. and Mexico at the federal level.  These 
issues include apportionment of surface flows of the 
Santa Cruz River and transboundary aquifer manage-
ment.  Fourth, the U.S. federal appropriations have 
funded and continue to fund the major part of municipal 
wastewater collection and treatment for both Nogales, 
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Arizona and Sonora.  Residents and industry on both 
sides of the border have avoided paying the full costs of 
municipal wastewater collection and treatment.  Fifth, 
wastewater has been transformed from being just an en-
vironmental “bad” to being an important good.  Treated 
effluent from the international treatment plant has be-
come an increasingly valuable resource as population 
and water demand grows on both sides of the border.  
The contribution of the treated effluent to riparian eco-
system function has also received increasing recognition 
in water policy debates.  
 
1930s and 1940s  
 
Active involvement in water management of Ambos 
Nogales by the U.S. and Mexican federal governments 
began in the 1930s in response to flooding.  The Inter-
national Boundary Commission (IBC), a joint U.S.- 
Mexico water engineering commission, recommended a 
series of flood control conduits and channels.  Federal 
funds were provided jointly by the United States and 
Mexico for flood control infrastructure on both sides of 
the border.   These flood control measures also in-
creased the flow of water and pollution over the border 
into Arizona.   
 
In 1944, a Water Treaty between the United States and 
Mexico that apportioned the Colorado and Rio Grade 
Rivers also established the International Boundary and 
Water Commission (IBWC) as the successor of the IBC.  
The IBWC is made up of U.S. and Mexican Sections.  
The jurisdiction of the IBWC is specific and narrow, 
extending only to water management problems that are 
binational.  The Commission is primarily a technical 
agency staffed by engineers, and focuses on scientific 
appraisals and engineering solutions to water manage-
ment problems.  Initially, the Commission focused on 
surface water supply and infrastructure issues.  But 
growing population pressure and pollution in Ambos 
Nogales and elsewhere on the border has drawn the 
Commission’s attention increasingly toward water sani-
tation problems (Frisvold & Caswell, 2000).   
 
A 1946 Arizona State Engineer’s report to the IBWC 
chronicles the beginnings of water pollution problems in 
Ambos Nogales (Ingram & White, 1993).  The report 
stated that the two cities should be considered a single 
community from a public health perspective. The main 
source of water to both towns was the Nogales, Arizona, 
water plant that served the entire Arizona side as well as 
downtown businesses and some residences on the 
Sonora side.  Many of the Sonora customers were also 
connected to a wastewater treatment plant on the Ari-
zona side.  The engineer noted that sewage from Sono-
ran households without connections were draining di-
rectly into the Nogales, Arizona, and warned that ex-
pansion of ground water pumping and delivery systems 
in Sonora would increase the flow of liquid wastes with 
negative consequences for public health. Cases of ty-
phoid and dysentery had already been reported in Santa 
Cruz County, Arizona.  The report also noted that the 
Arizona Department of Health had advocated “a single 
sewerage system and disposal plant (for the entire town) 
which would efficiently and economically handle the 
situation (Ingram & White, 1993).”  Here, the “entire 
town” meant both Nogales, Arizona and Sonora.  
 
City officials in Nogales, Arizona, went straight to the 
Arizona Congressional Delegation and the IBWC to ob-
tain federal funds for expanding sewage collection and 
treatment capacity in Ambos Nogales.   The result was 
an IBWC designed project to extend more sewage col-
lecting lines into Mexico that would feed, along with 
lines on the Arizona side, into a new treatment plant lo-
cated two miles north of the border.  Because the slope 
of the topography went from Sonora to Arizona, it 
would be cheaper and more effective to have the collec-
tion system drain northward.  The construction costs 
were to be borne equally between the U.S. and Mexican 
Sections of the IBWC, funded through federal appro-
priations by each government.  The new plant was com-
pleted in 1951. Originally the cities were to split the 
costs of plant operation and maintenance in proportion 
to each city’s share of effluent produced.  Senator Carl 
Hayden of Arizona, however, was able to pass legisla-
tion providing partial federal funding for Nogales, Ari-
zona’s obligation. 
 
1950s to 1990s 
 
In the 1950s, Nogales, Arizona, residents became con-
cerned about the potential impact of ground water 
pumping and diversions of the Santa Cruz by Mexico on 
the future of their own water supplies.  Both cities ex-
pressed interest in a treaty that would allow for a com-
mon ground water withdrawal and distribution system 
for residents and business on both sides of the border.  
There are a number of advantages for both cities in de-
veloping a common system.  Arizona has ground water 
wells that are deeper, less sensitive to drought, and less 
vulnerable to contamination from sewer pipe leaks and 
raw sewage flows.  Flood control and pollution preven-
tion measures (such as improved sewerage or pre-
treatment of industrial wastewater) can be more effec-
tively taken upstream in Mexico. 
 
While the two cities may have desired broader bina-
tional cooperation, the U.S. Section of the IBWC was 
less enthusiastic.   There has yet been no agreement be-
tween the two nations over the apportionment of the wa-
ters of the Santa Cruz River.  In the 1950s the United 
States was using over half the water in the Santa Cruz 
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River watershed, even though a third of water came 
from the United States.  The U.S. Section recommended 
against negotiating with Mexico over water supply, in-
stead suggesting either the construction of a pipeline to 
divert the waters of the Santa Cruz before they entered 
Mexico or building a dam near Nogales, Arizona to cap-
ture and store flood waters.   At that time, the IBWC 
dealt primarily with surface water projects.  The Com-
mission was not given authority to negotiate over trans-
boundary ground water management until 1973, with 
the signature of Minute 242.  Even now, the Commis-
sion has yet to begin such negotiations (Mumme, 1993).   
 
Without support at the federal level, the two cities did 
not proceed with more comprehensive water resource 
planning.  Nogales, Arizona had also grown accustomed 
to the IBWC providing engineering expertise and finan-
cial support for the continued operation of the treatment 
plant.  Mexico’s legal system limits the ability of local 
governments to issue bonds against user fees or real es-
tate taxes.  Financing of such projects was decided at 
the federal level in Mexico City (Liverman et al., 1999).  
    
 
Growth in population, ground water pumping, and water 
pollution in Sonora led to a series of public health crises 
and to expansion of treatment facilities on the Arizona 
side.  By 1958, the capacity of the international treat-
ment plant was regularly exceeded, with raw sewage 
flowing into the Nogales Wash.  In 1963, the U.S. Sec-
tion finally recommended construction of a new treat-
ment plant.  The U.S. wanted to construct a new plant, 
located nine miles north of the border to treat both U.S. 
and Mexican wastewater.  Mexico preferred a more 
modest expansion of the current plant closer to the bor-
der.  The two countries did not agree on the plan and 
cost apportionment of the project until 1967 and the 
plant was not operational until 1971.  Mexico was in 
less of a hurry to deal with external costs affecting the 
United States, particularly as they had their own con-
cerns about the salinity of Colorado River water flowing 
into Mexico.  The plant was eventually constructed nine 
miles north of the border just downstream from the con-
fluence of the Santa Cruz and the Nogales Wash.   
About 54 percent of construction funds came from U.S. 
federal appropriations  (from the IBWC and the EPA).  
Mexico paid 29 percent, an amount equal to the cost of 
the plant expansion at the existing site.  Nogales, Ari-
zona paid for the remaining 17 percent (Ingram & 
White, 1993).   
 
By 1976, plant capacity was again exceeded, leading to 
another round of public health concerns and protracted 
negotiations.  The U.S. Section of the IBWC wanted to 
expand the existing facility.  The Mexican Section 
wanted to build a facility on its side of the border.  The 
Mexican Section was coming to appreciate the value of 
effluent leaving the treatment plant.  The U.S. Section 
was concerned that a plant constructed on more hilly 
terrain at the wider part of the valley in Sonora would 
not be of sufficient scale and operated and maintained 
adequately to prevent continued sewage spills in the 
United States.  These concerns were well founded.   At 
the time, San Diego, California, was suffering from un-
controlled sewage flows emanating from Tijuana, Mex-
ico (Frisvold & Caswell, 2000).  The U.S. IBWC engi-
neers recommended a gravity flow collection system 
with a large, main treatment plant located downstream 
in San Diego.  The United States insisted that Mexico 
pay half the cost of the $730 million project that would 
primarily benefit San Diego.  Instead Mexico acted uni-
laterally, building a smaller system on its side of the 
border.  The capacity of this plant was soon exceeded 
and both sides eventually agreed on a larger design.   
 
From the U.S. perspective, a plant in Nogales, Sonora, 
would capture effluent that could otherwise be used by 
the United States in dry periods, but would be overrun 
with sewage during wet periods.  They did not want to 
see a repetition of the Tijuana-San Diego debacle.  From 
Mexico’s perspective, they had (and still have) a legal 
right to retain or reclaim their share of the effluent com-
ing out of the International Treatment Plant.  But the 
plant’s location, nine miles downhill from the border 
makes pumping it back prohibitively expensive.  An 
agreement was finally reached in 1988 with U.S. EPA 
and U.S. Section of the IBWC contributing 66 percent 
to construction costs; Nogales, Arizona, 26 percent; and 
Mexico, 8 percent (Ingram & White, 1993).    
 
Sewage crises have continued throughout the 1990s, 
with greater attention also paid to levels of hazardous 
industrial wastes entering the U.S. water supply.   In 
each case, the response has been reactive, limited engi-
neering solutions.  These have included a temporary 
dam to store contaminated water, placing chlorine gran-
ules in the Nogales Wash, and successive expansions of 
the International Treatment Plant.   
 
Economic and Environmental Significance of Effluent 
 
As noted at the outset, both Mexico and the United 
States have a growing appreciation of the economic and 
environmental benefits of the treated effluent from the 
International Treatment Plant.  Water supplies in Ari-
zona’s Santa Cruz Active Management Area (SCAMA) 
are vulnerable to drought.  ADWR has determined that 
SCAMA is currently under “safe-yield conditions” - 
conditions are not generating a secular decline in the 
water table.  Yet, the storage capacity in the aquifers is 
limited, so the water table drops significantly in drought 
years, and recharge and draw down are asymmetric.  If 
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wet years follow in succession, the aquifers may not be 
able to absorb much additional water in the second year.  
Unlike other areas of the state (notably Tucson and 
Phoenix), the area does not have infrastructure to de-
liver surface water from the Colorado or other rivers to 
the area.    
 
Currently the largest demand on the system is  mainte-
nance of the riparian area.  If Mexico were able to retain 
or reclaim their share of the treated effluent from the 
International Treatment Plant, maintaining current 
streamflow in the Santa Cruz River would require dras-
tic cut backs in agricultural, industrial, or municipal 
consumption to prevent overdrafting in drier years.  
Drawing down the water table in dry years needn’t im-
ply a secular decline in the water table.  The ADWR is 
currently developing a dynamic hydrologic model to 
assess the impacts of changes in these flow variables 
(including loss of Mexican effluent) on the long-term 
stock of ground water.  Planning and modeling to date, 
however, have not included much explicit consideration 
of water supplies and use on the Sonoran side of the 
border. 
 
A number of interest groups in Santa Cruz County, Ari-
zona, are interested in acquiring more permanent property 
rights over Mexico’s share of the effluent.  Environmental 
groups such as the Friends of the Santa Cruz River want 
assured streamflow to maintain the riparian habitat (More-
house et al., Ilich and Varady).  Currently, because Mexico 
owns 70 percent of the effluent, this water cannot be used 
in calculations of 100-year assured water supplies.  Thus, 
the fact that SCAMA doesn't own the water constrains the 
amount of development that will be permitted in the area.  
Developers and ADWR anticipate growth in the retirement 
community of Rio Rico (located between Nogales and 
Tucson) to grow from 9,000 in 2000 to over 23,000 by 
2025 (ADWR).  Other current water users in the SCAMA 
would like to avoid loss of the Mexican effluent because 
this would likely induce ADWR to impose conservation 
requirements.   As in the past, local interests in Santa Cruz 
County are looking to the federal government.  This time 
they would like the federal government to provide funds to 
acquire the water from Mexico (GUAC). 
 
Mexico has in fact discussed options for retaining the 
effluent.  Options include constructing a new treatment 
plant in Sonora and diverting the effluent for irrigated 
agriculture and industrial use.  Another proposed project 
would allow the current amount of effluent to flow to 
the International Treatment Plant, but construct a plant 
to capture effluent from future water use in Nogales, 
Sonora. Nogales, Sonora’s population is projected to 
grow by another 139,000 by 2018.  Water users in Ari-
zona have an interest in not only the existing flow into 
the International Treatment Plant, but would also like 
acquiring the rights to this additional effluent.  This is 
seen as a means to address the competing demands of 
preserving the riparian area and providing water for de-
velopment.  Mexico has discussed the possibility of 
building an electricity generating plant that would make 
use of wastewater that would otherwise flow to Arizona.  
Some business interests have floated plans to build the 
electricity plant on the Arizona side, keeping the efflu-
ent and selling electricity primarily to Sonora (GUAC).  
Mexico has also proposed doubling its current ground 
water pumping, which could have additional impacts on 
the aquifers in Arizona (Liverman, et al., 1997).   
 
The current state of affairs is this:  Mexico owns its 
share of the effluent, but doesn't control it.  The United 
States controls the effluent but doesn't own Mexico’s 
share of it.  At the local level, both sides are waiting to 
see if U.S. federal appropriations might create incen-
tives for some sort of permanent sale.  In the meantime, 
environmental groups see the current impasse, blocking 
the speed of development and diversion of stream flow, 
as a good thing.  Yet they worry about the environ-
mental consequences of Mexican proposals to retain the 
effluent.  
 
PROJECT PLANNING AND FINANCING IN THE 
POST-NAFTA ERA 
 
In response to objections by environmental groups to the 
U.S.-Mexico North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), both nations established the Border Environ-
mental Cooperation Commission (BECC) and the North 
American Development Bank (NADBank).  The NADBank 
arranges financing of water and municipal solid waste pro-
jects within 100 km of the international border.  These pro-
jects must be certified by the BECC based on environmental, 
technical feasibility, and financial criteria.   
  
The IBWC has responded to border sanitation problems af-
ter they arise.  As a scientific-engineering agency, they have 
focused on engineering, structural solutions.  The agency has 
neither the mandate nor the expertise to address problems of 
market failures or incentive problems that lead to water pol-
lution crises in the first place.  Firms located on the border 
have not had to pay the full social costs of their production 
and release of industrial wastes into water bodies.  A second 
problem is the lack of financing for water infrastructure to 
support the rapidly growing workforce on the Mexican side 
of the border.  Historically, firms have not paid by way of 
user fees or taxes to finance safe drinking water or sewer 
systems for the growing workforce.   Labor continues to 
flock to the border despite the lack of public services be-
cause wages in the border region are much higher than in 
Mexico on the whole.  Mexico’s legal system does not allow 
local municipalities to issue bonds against user fees or prop-
erty taxes.  Even on the U.S. side of the border, local mu-
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nicipalities pay only a fraction of the cost for local water 
treatment infrastructure.  Instead, as in the case of Nogales, 
San Diego, and other border cities, they have relied on peri-
odic federal bailouts to deal with public health emergencies.  
As a consequence, because cities and businesses on both 
sides of the border are not paying the social costs of border 
growth, population and sewage growth has outstripped local 
infrastructure.  
 
NADBank’s purpose is to help border communities with 
long-term funding of water and solid waste projects.  Border 
cities are limited in their abilities to self-finance water infra-
structure.  Because of risks associated with these invest-
ments, it is difficult to obtain long-term financing through 
international markets.   Capitalized by both the Mexican and 
U.S. governments, NADBank can secure financing at lower 
commercial rates than border communities could otherwise 
obtain for commercial loans.  NADBank also uses funds to 
leverage other private loans and grants that communities 
may not otherwise be able to secure.  The NADBank is a 
bank, not a grant agency.  Water projects must be able to 
repay loans, raising funds through user fees or other mecha-
nisms.   
 
BECC must certify projects before the NADBank may 
finance them.  The BECC certification criteria include 
project impacts on human health and the environment, 
technical and financial feasibility, project management, 
community participation, and sustainable development.  
The BECC also provides technical assistance for local 
entities developing proposals, analyzes environmental 
and financial aspects of projects, and helps arrange pub-
lic financing for projects.   
 
In the first two years of BECC-NADBANK operation, no 
BECC certified projects secured NADBank funding, primar-
ily because projects were not meeting NADBank’s financial 
criteria.   NADBank  found  projects lacking in five areas: 
(a) insufficient community resources for high cost projects; 
(b) lack of master plans and inadequate proposal preparation; 
(c) limited financial, administrative, and commercial capa-
bilities of local water agencies; (d) inadequate revenue for 
the sound operation of existing systems and resistance to 
charging / raising user fees; and (e) lack of private sector in-
volvement in environmental projects.  
 
Given the history of financing of border water projects, these 
problems should be of little surprise.  The level of growth 
and development on the border has been fostered by a no or 
low-user fee environment for several years.  The pace of 
growth is much greater than it would have been had projects 
been funded on a “pay as you go” basis.  Internalizing exter-
nalities after high population densities and pollution prob-
lems have been reached entails high adjustment costs.  In 
addition, communities on both sides of the border have 
grown accustomed to receiving federal funding for federally 
planned water projects, albeit sporadically and in response to 
crises.   
 
To address the problems of transitioning to a more lo-
cally self-financing system, the U.S. EPA and NAD-
Bank established the Border Environmental Infrastruc-
ture Fund (NADBank, 1998).  The fund receives and 
administers grants that may be combined with loans or 
loan guarantees.  Grants may support municipal infra-
structure, drinking water treatment plants, and treated 
water distribution systems.  Funds may be used to allow 
user fees to be phased in over time. 
 
Since 1995, the BECC has certified 40 projects receiving 
funding or commitments of funding of more than $1 billion. 
The BECC has earmarked more than $20 million dollars in 
grants for technical assistance to aid communities move pro-
jects through certification.   Water project development 
throughout the border area is now proceeding in a more co-
ordinated and proactive manner.  Investments are being 
made before crises emerge and projects are being developed 
with more considerations of long-term needs in mind.   
 
Yet, the goal of developing locally self-financing mu-
nicipal water systems on both sides of the border has 
remained elusive.  The United States and Mexican gov-
ernments have contributed $152 million each in paid-in 
capital to the NADBank.  Combined with callable capi-
tal, this adds up to a lending capacity of roughly $2 bil-
lion (Reed, 2000).  NADBank has approved financing 
for 29 projects, but loans account for a small fraction of 
project financing.  While NADBank has approved $265 
million in loans and grants, $253 million, over 95 per-
cent, of this has been BEIF grants.  Actual loans account 
for less than 5 percent of financing (Reed, 2000).  While 
U.S. borrowers could obtain loans at rates lower than 
taxable municipal bonds, NADBank rates are higher 
than rates available through the State Revolving Fund or 
tax-exempt municipal bonds, which are subsidized. (For 
additional discussion of interest rate charges and de-
mand for NADBank loans, see U.S. GAO, 2000).  Since 
1994, the U.S. federal government has provided $2.02 
million for border infrastructure spending, 65 percent of 
the total.  Mexico has provided $0.65 million (21 per-
cent) and U.S. border states $0.45 million (14 percent) 
(U.S. GAO).  The EPA accounts for more than half of 
U.S. federal appropriations.  In short, EPA (via BEIF) 
continues to be the major source of funding for water 
projects on both sides of the border. 
 
Problems of instituting local self-financing of projects 
continue in Ambos Nogales as well as elsewhere along 
the border.  A new BECC-NADBank approved project 
to upgrade the International Treatment Plant is projected 
to cost $46.1 million.  Over 85 percent of the funds will 
come from EPA, via BEIF grants.  Arizona users have 
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accepted proposed fee increases.  Yet, given population 
and per capita water use projections, the increase in 
fees, even after being fully phased in, would bring in 
less than $2 million per year.  
 
In 1996, the BECC received substantial criticism when 
it provis ionally certified the Acuaférico project for No-
gales, Sonora, without requiring specifics about the user 
fee structure planned to finance the project (Milich & 
Varady, 1999).  The ambitious $39 million project 
claims to provide “uninterrupted service to 100 percent 
of the population.”  The project would upgrade the ex-
isting water distribution system that has over 7,000 
leaks per year and connect households to both the deliv-
ery and wastewater treatment system.  The project 
would also establish a metering and billing system to 
charge for water services.  Various NGOs complained 
that certification was premature for equity and environ-
mental reasons.  One concern was that the poor would 
bear an undo share of the project’s costs.  Some groups 
advocated a block-pricing scheme that would shift a 
higher proportion of the costs to maquiladoras and other 
high volume users.  Environmental groups expressed 
concern over the potential impact of further ground wa-
ter pumping and potential loss of effluent on the riparian 
area in Arizona.  The latest version of the project an-
nounces “micro-scale” metering for medium and high 
volume users.  The project would rely on additional 
ground water supplies from interbasin transfers rather 
than tapping further into the Santa Cruz Basin aquifer.  
By reducing leaks, the plan would improve capture in 
Sonora and reduce the amount of wastewater flowing to 
the International Treatment Plant.  A contract for the 
operation and maintenance of the system has been 
awarded, but contract negotiations are ongoing.  It re-
mains to be seen what the user fee structure will look 
like, what public reaction will be, and if the system can 
operate in a self-financing manner.  As with other pro-
jects, direct grants are providing a substantial share of 
the project funds.   
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
New institutions created to address environmental con-
cerns over NAFTA have helped both nations plan, 
build, and finance new facilities in a more coordinated 
and proactive manner.  The BECC certification process 
has allowed discussion of border water problems to ex-
pand beyond simple engineering responses to sanitation 
crises to broader consideration of incentives and long-
term investment needs.  In Ambos Nogales as elsewhere 
along the border, project development is more forward-
looking than 10 years ago.   
 
The goal of developing locally self-financing municipal 
water systems on both sides of the border has remained 
elusive, however.  Grants from EPA’s Border Environ-
mental Infrastructure Fund (BEIF) (and other U.S. fed-
eral agencies) continue to be the primary vehicle financ-
ing new investments.  The sustainability of this practice 
may be in doubt as enthusiasm by the U.S. Congress for 
BEIF funding is declining, despite continued rapid 
growth in the region (GAO).  
 
Recent U.S. government proposals, embodied in the re-
cent U.S. GAO Report and EPA, U.S. State Department 
and Treasury Department responses (U.S. GAO), to en-
hance public and private investment in border water in-
frastructure call for “a strategic plan” and setting of 
“milestones” to monitor accomplishments.  Yet much 
data has already been assembled documenting shortfalls 
in wastewater collection and treatment infrastructure.   
 
Ongoing policy discussions, at least among U.S. gov-
ernment agencies, continue to treat border water prob-
lems as primarily infrastructure and engineering prob-
lems.  Noticeably absent is any consideration of link-
ages between water quality and quantity.  The historical 
example of Ambos Nogales demonstrates that questions 
of water quality and quantity cannot be easily separated.  
Indeed, pervasive disagreements of over quantity issues 
remain a key impediment to resolving water quality 
problems.  Important missing considerations are rela-
tionships between water quantity and quality and man-
agement of transboundary aquifers.  Brown and 
Mumme (2000) have recommended establishing Bina-
tional Water Councils that would negotiate and plan wa-
ter management on a local watershed basis.  To date, 
however, U.S. agencies have remained wary of linking 
negotiations over border water sanitation to broader wa-
ter quantity and allocation issues.   
 
The United States has financed border water projects to 
mitigate transboundary externalities.  The historical ex-
ample of Ambos Nogales and other border metropolitan 
areas reveals that this has created perverse incentives.  
By financing water distribution and wastewater collec-
tion and treatment infrastructure in Mexico, the United 
States has improved public services, albeit unevenly, for 
the local workforce.  By doing so, it has subsidized the 
location of industrial plants and the accompanying 
workforce, near the border.  This subsidization has 
spurred further growth that has led to further spending 
on sanitation infrastructure, and further growth.  The 
controversy over the Acuaférico project in Nogales, 
Sonora, demonstrates that breaking this cycle will be 
difficult. If projects are to be locally self-financing, 
what are appropriate user fees to charge households ver-
sus maquiladoras?   To what extent will local munici-
palities in Mexico be given authority to retain locally 
the fees that are charged?  Recent political changes in 
Mexico point to greater decentralization of decision-
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making, but the question of who in Mexico can or will 
pay for future investments in water infrastructure re-
mains uncertain.   
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ENDNOTES  
 
                                                                 
1 Transboundary externalities are bi-directional.  For example, U.S. practices affect the level and salinity of Colo-
rado River water received by Mexico.  U.S. proposals to line the All-American Canal in California would affect 
ground water availability in Mexico’s Mexicali Va lley.   
 
 
 
